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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE O·F UTAH 
l(EITH B. I~~I~LIS and \ 7IRG IXIA. 
EIJLIS, LOEL T. 1-lEP\VC)RTfi and 
CO~:NII1~ JO l\f. HEPWORTH, 
~\J)~\l\[ ~f. DT~:~CP. .. X and SHIR-
LENE H. DtTN·CAN. RICHARD B. 
BUI\.TON and _i\XN B. l1 t ~RTON. 
Plaintiffs and Appr1lants, 
-vs.-
KARL B. I-IALE and DELSA G. 
HALE, ROY A. BARRETT and 
RUTH R. BARRETT, J. THEO-
DORE ELDERS, JR., and LOIS H. 
ELDERS, RALPH D. FISHER and 
BARBARA H. FISHER, LE GRAND 
P. BACJ(~fAN" and :I\IILTON \'". 
BACKMAN, d.b.a., BACKMAN AB-
STRACT AND TITLE COMPANY, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
9537 
BRIEF OF AP·P·ELLANTS 
NATURE OF CASE 
The plaintiffs brought this action in the Third Dis-
trict Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, for damages 
allegedly sustained due to the wrongful action of all 
the defendants herein arising from a sale of certain real 
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property by the defendants and their agents to the 
plaintiffs, Shirlene Duncan, Adam Duncan, Keith B. 
Ellis and Virginia Ellis; and further for the resulting 
damages to the other named plaintiffs from and due to 
the \Vrongful acts of the defendants. The instant appeal 
is fro1n an order of the 1-Ionorable Ray VanCott, Jr., 
Judge, granting the defendants' motion to dismiss plain-
tiffs' complaint with prejudice. 
DISPOSITION IN LO\VER COURT 
On the 27th of April, 1961, the original complaint 
1n this action \vas filed (R. 1), and an order to show 
cause issued thereon by Judge J1arcellus K. Sno\v. (R. 
10). Thereafter, a motion to vacate the plan tiffs' order 
to sho\v cause (R. 13) and motion to dismiss plaintiffs' 
complaint \Vere filed. A hearing "~as held thereon in 
:\lay, 1961 (R. 22). The order to sho\\" cause hearing 
resulted in no material action. Thereafter the plaintiffs 
filed an a1nended complaint (R. :37) on June 5, 1961, and 
a motion to dismiss \vas made by defendants. lTpon 
hearing thereon before the Honorable Aldon J. Anderson, 
J ud'ge, an order ",.as entered denying the defendants' 
motion to disn1iss \vithout prejudice, a..11d plaintiffs \vere 
granted to file a second amended coin plaint. (R. 50). 
Thereafter, the plantiffs filed a n1otion to amend their 
complaint, \Vhich "~as again granted. (R. 33). On July 
10, 1961, the plaintiffs filed their second amended com-
plaint. Motions to dismiss the second an1ended complaint 
",.Pre filed (R. 69) and on August 4, 1961, a hearing "~as 
held thereon before the Honorable Ray "\""anC·ott, Jr .. 
An order \Vas entered after hearing on 4 August 1961, 
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di~tnissing thP plantiff:~' second amended con1plaint as 
to all defendants. A notice of appeal from that order 
\\'"a~ filed by plaintiffs on 9 1\ugust 1961. This appeal 
i~ predieated upon the trial eonrt's order granting the 
dPfPndants' motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' second 
an1ended cornplaint. 
RELIEF SOtiGHT ON APPEAL 
The plaintiffs seel~ rever .. ~a.l of the trial court's 
order granting the defendant's motion to dismiss the 
plaintiffs' second amended complaint, and that the de-
fendants be compelled to answer said complaint. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendants, ICarl B. Hale, Delsa G. Hale, J. 
Theodore Elders, Jr., Lois H. Elders, Ralph D. Fisher 
and Barbara H. Fisher, \vill be referred to in this brief 
as the defendants Hale, Elders and Fisher unless other-
wise specifically designated. The defendants Roy A. and 
Ruth R. Barrett \\:ill be designated as defendants Barrett 
unless other,vise specifically designated. The plaintiffs 
Keith B. Ellis and \'"irginia Ellis, and Adam M. Duncan 
and Shirlene H. Duncan \vill be referred to as plaintiffs 
Ellis and Duncan, unless other\vise specifically desig-
nated, and the same reference will be made to Richard 
and Ann Burton. 
The facts relied upon in prosecution of the appeal 
are generally set in the plaintiffs' second amended com-
plaint. The allegations are that the defendants Hale, 
Elders and Fisher engaged the engineering firm of Bush 
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and Gudgell in early 1959 to survey a piece of land in 
Salt Lake County which these defendants owned. The 
firm of Bush and Gudgell surveyed the defendants' 
property and divided it into four building lots, and pre-
pared a subdivision plat therefor \Vhich they presented 
to the Salt County Planning and Zoning Commission 
on or about May 15, 1959. This subdivision embraced 
the defendants Hale, Elders and Fisher's property, as 
such, and was identified on the plat as '~:,Iount Olympus 
Park No. 5." (R. 57). It is further alleged that the 
defendants Hale, Elders and Fisher "~ere co-partners 
as to the development of the above mentioned subdivision 
building lots (R. 56), and that all the defendants were 
engaged together as co-partners and joint adventures 
in real estate transactions. 
It \vas further alleged that subsequent to the filing 
of the proposed plat, above 1nentioned, the Hale, Elders, 
and Milton ,r. Backman, their attorney and agent, re-
ceived notice from the Salt I_Jake County Planning Com-
mission that the plat could not be accepted until the 
County "'Subdivision Ordinance," Title 9~ Salt Lake 
County Ordinances, \vas con1plied \Yith. This ordinance 
requires the subdivider to provide eurb, gutter, side-
\valk, fire hydrant, "Tater drainage and other facilities, 
and also requires that the subdiYided lots be of a certain 
size, in \Yhich particulars the four above 1nentioned lots 
are alleged to be deficient. 
It was alleged that during t~1e spring of 1959 that 
defendants Hale, Elders and Fisher conveyed to defen-
dants Barrett three lots identified on the plat prepared 
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by Gudgell as Lots 1, :2, and ;~ ( lL 5S), and that in July 
and ..:\ngnst, 1959, defendants Barrett conveyed by \\?ar-
ranty deed all three lots to plaintiffs Adam jl. and 
Shirlene Duncan for good consideration. That Lots 2 
and ;~ had in l!);)S heen conve~?ecl b~~ defendants fiale to 
thPir children and spouses. ( R. 3S). By \Yarranty deed 
<latPd 7 J ui~~, 1959, a conveyance of land described in 
1netcs and bounds and bearing the description "'Lot 2" 
\\~as conveyed to plaintiffs Adam ni. and Shirlene Dun-
can by defendants, Fisher and Hale, and that by \\Tar-
ranty deed dated 7 July, 1959 a conveyance in land 
described in metes and bounds and bearing the descrip-
tion "Lot 1'' \\Tas conveyed by defendants Hale and 
Elders to plaintiffs Duncan. (Both lots corresponded 
to Lots 1 and 2 on the subdivision plat above mentioned. 
In addition, on August 7, 1959, a conveyance of land 
described in n1etes and bounds, and bearing the descrip-
tion "Lot 3" ,,~a s conveyed by defendants Hale and 
Barrett to plaintiffs Duncan by warranty deed. "Lot 4'' 
of the ~[t. Olympus Park Subdivision \Yas conveyed by 
defendants Elders to plaintiffs Keith and Virginia Ellis 
by \varranty deed on 27 January 1960. Both of these lots 
corresponded to Ijots ''3" and "4" on the ~It. Olyn1pus 
Subdivision plat. 
It is alleged that the plaintiffs applied for building 
permits on these properties to the Salt Lake County 
Planning Commission, and have been refused permits 
because of the failure of defendants to comply with 
57-5-5 and 17-27-21, U.C.A. 1953, and, further, that the 
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county will not issue permits until full compliance with 
Title 9 SLCO has been effected. 
The plaintiffs Duncan, it is alleged, subsequent to 
the receipt of the above conveyances, conveyed their 
interest in the lots to plaintiffs Loel T. Hepworth and 
Connie J o ~I. Hepworth and Richard B. Burton and 
Ann B. Burton, (R. 19), but that said sale cannot be 
consummated because of the defl~ndants' wrongdoing. 
It is alleged that the reference in the deeds to 
Duncans above mentioned conveying "Lot 1, HLot 2'' and 
"Lot 3", was intended to incorporate by reference the 
lots on the plat prepared by Bush and Gudgell as Mount 
Olympus Park :\ o. 5, and that as subdivision lots they 
\Vould be \Yorth $6,000.00 each, but only \vorth $100.00 
as non building lots. (R. 61). 
It is alleged that all the defendants caused the pur-
ported plat or plan of Jiount Oly1npus Park X o. 5 to 
be shO\\Tn to Adam 11. Duncan and Keith B. Ellis and 
oral reference \\Tas made to the conveyer lands with 
respect to the platted lots, and that this reference and 
disclosure \vas to induce the purchase· of the lots by 
Duncan and Ellis. (R. 1, 62). It is further alleged that 
Karl B. Hale did ''ith intent to defraud and \Yith full 
lmowledge of contrary facts, tell defendant Ray A. Bar-
rett that the lots \vere building lots, and did not dis-
close the refusal of approval by the County Planning 
Commission, and that defendants, through Barrett as 
co-partner of all defendants ( R. 56, Fourth, 61) then 
made similar misrepresentations to Duncan \vho, in 
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reliance thereon, purchased Lot:-; 1, :2, and 3. In addition, 
it is alleged that nfilton \~. Backman \\yas attorney and 
agent in fact for the defendants llale and a partner of 
Baelnnan Abstract and Title ·Cornpany, and that he \\ya~ 
infonned that Adarn ~d. Duncan "\Van ted the deeds in 
question to note the conveyances as subdivision lots, 
in that he, Backman, \Yas a\\·are that Duncan thought 
he \\·as purchasing three subdivision lots, but failed to 
disclose they \Vere not a part of an approved sub-
division. (R. 64). In addition, it is alleged that Backman 
further issued, as a partner of Backman Abstract and 
Title Company, an "Interim Title Insurance Binder" 
to Duncan as an inducement to the plaintiff Duncan to 
purchase said property, and that Backman failed to note 
the defects of non-subdivision property in the insurance 
binder. (R. 64). 
It is alleged that plaintiffs Ellis, upon purchasing 
"Lot 4" from defendants Elders who were co-p·artners, 
agents and principals of all the defendants, engaged the 
services of an architect to design a home for the lot 
and paid the sum of $5,000 therefor, but due to the 
failure of defendants to comply with Title 9, Salt Lake 
c·ounty Ordinances, construction could not be· commenced 
and the plans so p·repared were rendered useless. 
Finally, it is alleged that defendant Backman issued 
to plaintiffs Burton a title insurance policy covering 
Lots "1 and 2" and did not disclose therein the fact that 
the lots were not subdivision lots. 
Eight claims for relief based upon the above facts 
are set out in the complaint, and damages prayed on 
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each claim. The legal conclusions of each claim are 
contained in the record and have not been set out at 
length, but are treated in the arguments herein presented. 
The defendants' motion to dismiss the plan tiffs' com-
plaint based on the above facts was asserted on the 
ground~ of failure to state "facts upon "\vhich relief can 
be granted,'' and as to the defendants LeGrand P. Back-
man and Milton V. Backman, that it is an "improper 
misjoinder" of parties and claims. 
ARGL~fE~~T 
POINT I. 
THE APPELLATE COURT MUST VIEW THE RECORD 
IN A MANNER MOST FAVORABLE TO PLAINTIFFS. 
The trial court granted the defendants' n1otion to 
dis1niss the plaintiffs' second a1nended complaint, with 
prejudice, upon the merits as to all plaintiffs against 
all defendants. (R. 77). The basis of the defendants' 
motion was two-fold. First, it \vas contended the com-
plaint "does not state facts upon \vhich relief can be 
granted," and secondly, an ·'improper misjoinder of 
parties and causes of action'' as to defendants LeGrand 
P. Backman and l\Iil ton \T. Backman. ( R. 9). No ans"~er 
was ever filed, nor does the court's order reflect the 
basis for its holding. 
Since the trial court's ruling must be assumed to 
have encompassed all the bases urged by the defendants, 
before the ruling of the trial court may be affirmed, it 
must appear that the plaintiffs' complaint, """hen con-
strued in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs, You·ug 
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v. Texat~· Co., 8 Utah :206, 331 P.2nd 1099 (1958), states 
no grotmd for relief as against anr of the defendants by 
any of the plaintiffs, or that 1nisjoinder is an appropriate 
re1nedy for dismissal \vith prejudice. 
In I~iquor Control Conunission v. Athas, 121 l"Ttah 
-1:53, :2-t:-~ I> .:2d 4-l: 1 ( 1952), the court stated as to the 
propriety of granting a motion to dismiss : 
·~A n1otion to ds1niss should not be granted 
unless it appears to a certainty that plaintiff 
\vould be entitled to no relief under any state of 
fac-ts \vhich could be proved in support of its 
claim.'' 
The court further noted that a clai1n could be pleaded 
by ''recitation of conclusions of law or fact or both." 
To the degree that defendants' motion was based upon 
insufficiency of pleaded facts, it is contrary to the above 
rule. 
It is submitted that \vhen the second amended com-
plaint is viewed most favorably to any of the plaintiffs 
and as against any of the defendants, it is clear a claim 
for relief sufficient to meet the test of the Athas case 
has been pleaded and the trial court erred in not so find-
Ing. 
POINT II. 
THE PLAINTIFFS' FIRST CLAIM AGAINST ALL DE-
FENDANTS ADEQUATELY STATES A CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
ON TWO THEORIES: 
It is submitted that plaintiffs' second amended com-
plaint, First ·Claim~ adequately sets out a cause of action. 
9 
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The First Claim reasserts paragraphs 1-25 of the com-
plaint, and alleges in addition that "Subdivision Ordi-
nance" Title 9, Salt Lake County Ordinances, and Sec-
tions 57-5-5 and 17-27-21, U.C.A. 1953, give rise to a civil 
action in favor of plaintiffs upon violation thereof that 
proximately damages the plaintiffs. It is additionally 
alleged that the defendants caused the Mount Olympus 
Park No.5 plat or plan to be shown to plaintiffs Duncan 
and Ellis and that defendants never disclosed that the 
plan had not been recorded or approved; and, further, 
that in the deeds of conveyance and orally, reference was 
intended to be made to the subdivision and that no dis-
closure of non-approval or recording was made at such 
tin1e. Further, in the general allegations in paragraphs 
( 
1-25, it appears that Milton V" Backman and defendants 
Hale, Elders and Fisher {lad notice of rejection of the 
plat by Salt Lake County, and that sale of the lots 'vas 
n1ade to Duncan and Ellis 'Yith that kno,vledge. It is sub-
mitted that the defendants are liable to the plaintiffs in 
negligence, based on the facts alleged, in their failure to 
comply with the ordinances and statutes. 
A. NEGLIGENCE PREDICATED ON VIOLATION OF 
A STATUTE AND ORDINANCE; 
Title 9 of the Salt Lake County Ordinanees has been 
in effect in similar form to that presently in effect since 
17 Dece1nber 1952, and in present form since March 29, 
1959. The purposes of this ordinance are set forth in 9-2-1 
SLCO, which '3tates: 
"The tmderlying purpose and intent of this 
Title is to promote the health~ safety, convenience 
and general ""elfare of the inhabitants of the 
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unincorporated territory of the County in the 
matter of thP subdivision of land and to encourage 
the healthful grovvth of the county." 
The sale of subdivisio:a land or the subdivision there-
of is prohibited unless co1npliance with the ordinance has 
been had. 9-3-1 SLCO. The ordinance requires approval 
of County Planning Commission and sets up minimum 
subdivision requirements. Violation of this ordinance is a 
misdemeanor .. 1-1-6 SLCO. 
Title 17, Chapter 27~ lT.C.A. 1953, deals \Yith county 
zoning and planning, and 17-27-5, U.C.A. 1953, sets out 
thP purposes of the chapter, among which are to: 
" * * * promote the health, safety, morals, 
order, convenience, prosperity, or the general 
welfare of the inhabitants." 
Section 17-27-21, U.C.A. 1953, expressly provides: 
~'Whoever, being the owner or agent of the 
owner of any land located within a subdivision 
in a com1ty vvhere a county planning commission 
has been created, transfers or sells any land in 
such subdivision before a plan or plat of such 
subdivision has been approved by such planning 
commission and, except as set forth in the preced-
ing paragraph, recorded in the office of the 
county recorder, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor 
for each lot or parcel so transferred or sold~ 
and the description of such lot or parcel by metes 
and bounds in the instrttment of transfer or other 
,document used in the process of selling or trans-
ferring shall not exempt the transact~on from 
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Also bearing upon the subdivision of land is Title 
57, Chapter 5, U.C.A. 1953. Ths chapter allows the sub-
dividing of land, but provides that when it is so platted 
by the owner, an accurate rnap will be made which will 
be acknowledged, certified, and recorded, and if county 
or city approval is required, it should be obtained. 57-5-3, 
U.C.A. 1953. 57-5-5, U.C.A. 1953, provides: 
"If any person shall sell any lot so platted 
according to such plat before it is made out, 
acknowledged, filed and recorded as aforesaid, 
such person shall be guilty of a misdemeanor 
for each lot which he shall sell." 
It is admitted that the above sections are criminal 
statutes; hovvever, this does not preclude a civil remedy 
being based upon a violation thereof which is the proxi-
mate cause of a plaintiff's damages. Thus, in Texas P. 
Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 l~.s. 33 (1916), it "-as noted: 
"A disregard of the conunand of the statute 
is a 'vrongful act, and \Yhere it results in damage 
to one of the class for "-hose especial benefit the 
statute '"as enacted, the right to recover damages 
from the party in default is implied.'' 
A violation of a criminal statute or ordinance has been 
recognized as establishing son1e negligence as a matter 
of la\v. Arbuckle v. Wasatch Land&:. lnzprovenzent Co., 
120 Utah 358, :23± P.2d 607 (1951); Gibbs t·. Blue Cab 
Co., 249 P.2d 213 (lTtah 1952): Langlois r. Rees, 10 U.2d 
272, 351 P.2d 638 (1960). In the latter case, this court 
indicated that if a violation of a statute results in damage 
\vhich the statute is designed to prevent, a supportable 
cause of action exists. .L~lthough these cases dealt '"ith 
12 
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vehiele accidents or pPrsonal injuries, and statutory vio-
lations of thP pc<lPstrian and vehicle codes, the theory 
behind sneh holdings is not so limited. H1tckleberry v. 
1llissouri Pac. R.R., 32-l- I\fo. 10:25, 26 S.\\T. 2d 980 (1930); 
ill et:; v. ill cdforrl 111 Hr F'ood.s, 4 \Vis. 2d 96, 90 X.Yf. :2d 106 
(193S) ~ 1 RaJJ}Htport 1'. f·lichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 
195!1 ~ 2 ill ajar v. TVaverly & OrJdcn, Inc., 7 ~,.Y. 2d 33~, 
1(i;) ~.E. 2d 181 (1960); Din.i 1:. Naiditch, 170 X.E. 2d 881 
(Ill. 1960).3 See also Contrasting Images on Torts-The 
Judicial Personalit~r of Justice Traynor, 13 Stan. L. Rev. 
779, 785. Thus, negligence may arise in many trans-
aetions and cause substantial damage apart from physical 
injury, \vhere the conduct of the tortfeasor does not ap-
proach that of a reasonable man. Thus Prosser, Torts, 
2nd Ed., notes : 
"The standard of conduct of a reasonable 
man may be established by a statute or ordinance. 
The violation of such a legislative enactment may 
be negligence in itself if: 
a. The plaintiff is one of a class of persons 
whom the statute was intended to protect, 
and 
b. The harm which has occurred is of the 
type which it was intended to prevent." 
If the statute is not interpreted as intended to afford 
such protection, its violation may still, In some cases, 
be evidence of negligence for the jury. 
1. Liability was imposed based on a criminal statute for the 
sale of injurious animal foods. 
2. Illegal sale of alcohol. 
3. Building Code violations. 
13 
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A similar standard is found in the Restatement of 
Torts, Sec. 286, but, in addition, the restatement adds 
a section to cover particular hazards, and recognizes the 
defense of contributory negligence.4 It is also recognized 
that the presence or absence of a penalty is not material 
in the instant case. Parker v. Barnard, 135 Mass. 116, 
46 Am. Rep. 450 (1883); Restatement of Torts, Sec. 287. 
It may certainly be said that a reasonably prudent man 
would not violate a criminal statute-especially where 
he has kno·w1edge of it, as ''Tas alleged in the instant case. 
Lo\vndes, Civil LiabiZ,ity Created by Criminal Legisla-
tion, 16 I\finn. L. Rev. 361, 364 (1932). Prosser, supra, 
p. 153. The real question then is whether the plaintiffs 
in the instant case fit the above categories. There can 
be no doubt that the prohibitive sale ordinances and stat-
utes intended to cover these plaintiffs, since both Title 9 
of the County Ordinances and 17-27-5, U.C.A. 1953, set 
out the purpose of the legislation as being for the protec-
tion and general welfare of the inhabitants, in which class 
all plaintiffs fall. 57-5-5, lT.C.-6-t\.. 1953 has been enacted 
\vithout specifically setting out the legislative purpose; 
ho,vever, it goes "'ithout saying that these statutes are 
designed to protect the buyer fro1n receiving as a build-
ing lot, property \vhich may not have been so approved, 
and upon \\rhich he may not be able to build. This is so, 
since it is the sale or transfer ''Thich is prohibited-not 
just the building. 
4. The absence of contributory negligence need not be 
pleaded in Utah since it is an affirmative defense (Rule 8 (c), 
U.R.C.P.), and the facts before the court have not concerned 
such claim. Many other facts such as estoppel to raise the defense 
may be involved so that this issue is now immaterial. 
14 
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It is adrnitted that the scope of the chapters is to 
provide for regulated coininunity development, but the 
prohibition against sale is to insure that until the sub-
division is approved, the buyer 'vill not be 1nisled into 
thinking he is obtaining a good building lot. Da1nages 
have been recognized before for failure to comply ,,,.ith 
platting requirements. Bibber v. Weber, 102 NYS ~d 9-1-5 
(1951). That the homeo"\vner or purchaser is clearly 
within the class of persons sought to be protected is 
noted in 1\Ielli, Subdivision Control in Wisconsin, 1953, 
Wis. L. Rev. 389, "\vhere it is said: 
"In additon to protecting the community 
interests subdivision eontrol protects the lot pur-
chaser or home buyer and his mortgage lender. 
* * * 
For example, subdivisions located too far 
from fire protection, public transportation and 
schools are a poor investment for the average 
home owner. Areas so far from public \Vater and 
sewer that the cost of extending those services 
is prohibitive should also he avoided. This is 
true of subdivisions which beeause of an excess 
of subdivided' lots, may never be fully built up. 
In discouraging the subdivison of these areas the 
community is protecting the potential buyer. 
* * * 
By requiring a survey and plat of the planned 
area for official scrutiny, the community provides 
the buyer "\Yith accurate boundary lines thus elim-
inating costly boundary disputes." 
Subdivision regulations have always been con-
ceived in part as a control on fraudulent activities of 
promotors. 65 Har. L. Rev. 1226, 1227. 
15 
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In the instant case it is clear that the very evil 
sought to be avoided was the claimed result of defend-
ants' wrongdoing, that is, a buyer was sold a lot upon 
which it was thought valid building could he conrmenced, 
but such was not the case. The prohibition of the sale 
was, in part, for that very purpose, and thus gives rise 
to a cause of action. It seems clear then that in the in-
stant situation the selling of the lot, even though criminal, 
was also such action as to allow a civil remedy for the 
damages sustained. 
There can be no doubt either that the statute was 
violated, for the sale \vas in direct prohibition of the 
statute. 81nith v. Bach, 183 Cal. 259, 191 Pac. 14 (1920). 
California has a comparable statute, Sec. 11538, Cal. Bus. 
& Prof. Code, and in Smith v. Bach, supra, the Cali-
fornia Court held the statute \Yas for the benefit of the 
vendee and that he could rescind. If rescission is avail-
able, \vhy not damages~ In 27 Ops. _A_ tty. Gen. 66 (Cal.), 
the California Attorney General ruled that a sche1ne al-
most identical to that alleged here \Yas a Yiolation of the 
statute, and a sale by metes and hounds description could 
not re1nove it fron1 the statute. :?3 Ops ..... \.tty. Gen. 223 
(Cal.) ; 17-27-21, lJ.C.A. 1953. It is therefore subn1itted 
the plaintiffs' claim for negligence based upon a statutory 
violation \Yas \Yt}ll pleaded. The prayer for relief is 
for $23,600, or the difference bet\\~een \Yha t the value of 
the property \\'"ould have been if the ordinance and stat-
utes had been complied \Yith~ and "~hat it \viii take to com-
ply "'"i th the ordinances and statutes as to the four lots. 
This is the appropriate n1easure of d'a1nages. Nielson v. 
16 
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Ilausfo rd, 78 Colo. 43G, 2-±2 Pac. G77 ( 1926) ; Prosser, 
supra, p. 566.5 
B. NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION. 
It is submitted that the actions of the defendants, as 
alleged in the complaint, give rise to an additional cause 
of action, based upon negligence. It should be remember-
ed that it \vas alleged that the defendants \\"ere co-
partners in the land development business, and that they 
exhibited or caused to be exhibited to plaintiffs Duncan 
and Ellis a plat of a subdivision of l\iount Olympus Park 
No. 5, and that it was the understanding of the parties 
that the conveyances of the lots in question related to the 
platted lots. No disclosure of lack of recordation or ap-
proval of this subdivision \vas made, and the pleading 
clearly shows an inference left by defendants that this 
\\"as a valid subdivision. Although no intentional scienter 
is pleaded as to the first claim, the law has recognized 
that a tort action on the basis of negligence may arise 
from a negligent misrepresentation. 1958, Annual Survey 
of American Law 478. Thus, as noted in Sec. 528, Re-
statement of Torts : 
"A misrepresentation in a business trans-
action \vhich is believed to state the truth but 
\Vhich because of negligent expression states what 
is false is a negligent but not a fraudulent mis-
representation." 
Section 552 of the Restatement of Torts recognizes a 
cause of action for negligent misrepresentation where a 
5. An inappropriate claim for damages would not be a 
proper grounds for dismissal if a claim was otherwise stated. 
17 
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person engaging in a business or professional transac-
tion negligently communicates false information to an-
other. Prosser, Torts, 2nd Ed. ,p. 541, notes: 
"A representation made with an honest belief 
in its truth may still be negligent, because of lack 
of reasonable care in ascertaining the facts, or 
in the manner of expression. * * *" 
In the instant case it is submitted that even if the 
showing of the platted map to Duncan and Ellis was in 
an effort merely to locate the land, the means chosen was 
of such a nature as to express and leave an implication 
as pleaded, that subdivision lots were being sold. In 
Ashburn v. Miller, 326 P .2d 229 (Cal. 1958), it was held 
that a cause of action "ras made out 'vhere a lot was sold 
which consisted of filled land, and where the defendant, 
who had no actual knowledge of the fact, lead the plain-
tiffs to believe to the contrary. In Morris v. Miller, 104 
Ohio App. 461, 149 N.E. 2d 751 (1957), the court held 
pleadings similar to those set out in the plarntiffs' First 
Claim sufficient to state a cause of action for negligent 
misrepresentation. See Prosser, Torts, 2nd Ed., p. 536. 
Here, where the defendants are alleged to be co-partners 
and adventurers having much experience in the subdivid-
ing and promotion of land development (R. 56), a special 
duty to use care to avoid negligently conveying erroneous 
information exists. Harper & James, The Law of Torts, 
Sec. 7.6. In such cases, as noted by Prosser, supra, p. 
543-44: 
"When the re·presentation is made directly 
to the plaintiff, in the course of his dealing with 
the defendant, or is shown to him with kno,vledge 
18 
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that he intends to rely on it, there has been no 
difficulty in discovering a duty of reasonable 
care.'' 
In Decatur, Land, Loan & .~..4bstract Co. v. R1tfland, 
1S3 S.\\r. 1064 (Tex. 1916), it was held that the negligent 
giving of information as to the title of land by an ab-
stractor to a purchaser gave rise to a cause of action in 
tort. Certainly there is equally as great a duty upon the 
subdivider or seller of platted land to insure that a plain-
tiff is not 1uisled. Indeed, our Legislature has endeav-
ored to impose such an obligation. 57-5-1-12, U.C . ..:\. 1953. 
It is submitted, therefore, that a tort action for negligent 
rnisrepresentation is properly pleaded by plaintiffs. 
POINT III. 
THE PLAINTIFF ADAM M. DUNCAN HAS S'TATED A 
CLAII\I FOR RELIEF AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS IN I-IIS 
SECOND CLAIM FOR FRAUD AND DECEIT AND NEGLI-
GENT MISREPRESENTATION. 
It is submitted that the Second Claim adequately 
sets out a claim for relief in fraud and Inisrepresentation 
based upon t'vo theories: (1) deceit; (2) negligent mis-
representation. The facts as alleged are that defendant, 
Karl B. Hale, a co-partner of defendants Elders and 
Fisher (R. 56), made definite misrepresentations (R. 62) 
"Tith the intent to deceive, to Roy A. Barrett, who there-
after made the same representations to Adam ~I. Duncan, 
""ho in reliance thereon purchased Lots 1, 2, and 3 from 
the defendants. In addition, it is alleged that ~filton V. 
Backman, as agent and partner of Backman Abstract and 
Title Co., and of the defendants (R. 63), did with lmowl-
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edge that Adam 11. Duncan thought he was purchasing 
four building lots, fail to disclose the fact that the lots 
were not subdivision building lots. Further, that Back-
man Abstract & Title Company prepared three "Interim 
Title Insurance Binders" which were presented to Adam 
M. Duncan by Barrett, acting for the defendants, in an 
effort to have Duncan purchase the lots in question, which 
insurance binders did not disclose that the lots were not 
as represented. On this basis, it is submitted that all de-
fendants are liable to plaintiffs for damages for fraud 
and negligent misrepresentation. 
A. Fraud. 
In the second amended complaint, the facts alleging 
the fraud are set out "rith particularly as required by 
Rule 9 (b) U.R.C.P. In Davis Stock Co. v. Hill, :2 U. 2d 
20, 268 P.2d 988 (195-±), this court set out the require-
ments for a pleading of fraud, noting that the true facts 
must be alleged also, unless they appear obvious from the 
pleadings. In the instant ease the pleading amply sets 
out 'vith paricularity the alleged fraud, the showing of 
materiality and reliance, and "\Yhat in fact the true facts 
"\vere. There can be no complaint that the instant plead-
ings are not sufficient unless as a matter of law they do 
not state a claim for relief as set out. It is submitted 
that they adequately set out such a claim. 
First, as to the defendant 1\Iilton 'T· Backman, he 
was the agent and attorney for Hale, and although he 
kne'v that plaintiff Duncan was under the impression 
that he was purchasing building lots, he never made any 
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di~elosure to the contrary. In fact, he, Backman, issued 
a title insurance binder to Duncan, thus acting in a double 
capaeity. As to Backman's dual capacity, the la\v requires 
that he act \vith the upmost good faith. Thus, as noted 
in Prosser, supra, p. 534-35: 
Hin addition, certain types of. contracts, such 
as those of suretyship or guaranty, insurance, 
partnership and joint venture are recognized as 
creating something in the nature of a confidential 
relation, and hence as requiring the utmost good 
faith, and full and fair disclosure of all material 
facts.'' 
i\ recent Utah case notes the high responsibility 
placed on a fiduciary relationship to avoid misleading. 
Lynch v. J.li acDonald, No. 9406 (Jan. 2, 1962). If non-
disclosure can make out fraud then Backman's failure 
to make disclosure where he also kne\v Duncan thought 
he \Yas purchasing building lots was an actionable fraud; 
especially \\'"here it is alleged that Backman \vas fully 
a\vare of facts to the contrary. In Cole v. Parker, 5 U. 
2d 263, 300 P .2d 623 ( 1956), this court recognized that 
non-disclosure gives rise to an action in fraud, noting: 
'' * * *we agree with plaintiff's cited author-
ities that a material nondisclosure or a half-
truth may be the basis for an action on fraud 
as \veil as a positive representation. * * *" 
In doing so, the court relied upon Section 529 of the 
Restatement of Torts. Here, \vhere a special relationship 
is made out as attorney and agent for one side, and title 
insurer for the other, a duty of full and fair disclosure 
existed. It is submitted, therefore, that a fair cause has 
been stated a~ to Backman. It may be said that Duncan 
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had a duty to investigate, but this is a jury question 
when· all facts have been disclosed. Lewis v. White, 2 
U.2d 101, 269 P.2d 865; Cole v. Parker, supra. 
As to Hale, the acts of Backman as his agent may 
well make him liable. FJtuck v. Delta Land & Water Co., 
63 Utah 495, 227 Pac. 791 (1924); Sec. 257, Restatement 
of Agency 2nd, and even for nondisclosure. Restatement 
of Agency 2nd, Sec. 257 (c) ; Restatement of Torts, Sec. 
535. In addition, it appears that Hale was interested in 
the whole transaction since he made false representations 
to Barrett, a partner in some transactions, and it is 
alleged that all the defendants caused the insurance bind-
ers to be issued to Duncan, knowing the instruments did 
not disclose the true facts, and that Duncan was under a 
mis-impression. It was alleged that the binders were sub-
mitted to Duncan as an inducement for the sale. This was 
active participation and a duty of disclosure arose on the 
part of Hale and all the defendants. Whether Hale was 
authorized to act for Elders or Fisher is again a factual 
question. The facts, as pleaded, cover the nondisclosure of 
material facts, and as noted by the Wyoming Supreme 
Court in Steadman v. Topham, 338 P. 2d 820 (1959 
Wyo.): 
"Fraud may be perpetrated by silence as 
'vell as by representations and the former is at 
times the equivalent of the latter.'' 
As to the defendant Barrett, it is alleged that he 
made false statements to Duncan, showed him the plat 
map, and lead him to believe that the lots in question 'Yere 
subdivision lots, 'vhich Duncan relied on in purchasing 
the property. It is concluded that several Utah cases 
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have said that a "knowingly false representation" must 
be made to make a cause for fraud. Flenling v. Fleming-
[?elt Co., 7 U.2d 293, 323 P.2d 712; Auerbach v. Samuels, 
10 (J.:2d 152, 349 P.2d 1112 (1960). Knowledge of the 
falsity to Barrett is not specifically pleaded, but it need 
not be; it may be averred generally, and inferred from 
the fact8. Rule 9(b), U.R.C.P. Such is the allegation in 
the instant case. Even if knowledge is not sufficiently 
averred, the facts as set out are sufficient claim for re-
lief ''There Barrett "recklessly" affirmed as a fact solne-
thing of which he had no actual knowledge. Stuck v. 
Delta Land & Water Co., 63 Utah 495, 227 Pac. 791 
( 19:2-f.). Especially is that so where a document, such as 
a plat, was shown to Duncan. Restatement Torts, Sec. 
532. 
It is submitted, therefore, that an adequate clairn in 
fraud has been p~leaded. 
1\' egligent Misrepresentation. 
As . ''Tas noted in Poi~t II, negligence may raise a 
cause of action based upon a representation. It is debat-
able \vhether it is a cause of action in negligence or mis-
representation. Bohlen, Shottld f..7egligent Misrepresenta-
tions Be Treated as Negligence or Frattul, 18 -,ra. L. Rev. 
703 (1932). l\Iuch of what has been said under Point II 
is applicable under the instant claim, as to J3arrett, for 
negligently representing the facts. Harper & James, 
The Law of Torts, \Tol. 1, Sec: 7.7. Thus, ill Lerner v. 
Riverside Citr~ts Assn., 115 Cal. App. 2d 544, 252 P. 744 
( 1953), it was said : 
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"If, therefore, one asserts that a thing is 
true within his personal knowledge, or makes a 
statement as of his own knowledge, or makes 
such an absolute, unqualified and positive state-
ment as implies kno''Tledge on his part, when in 
fact he has no knowledge whether his assertion 
be true or false, and his statement proves to be 
false he is as culpable as if he had wilfully 
asserted that to be true which he kne'Y to be false 
and is equally guilty of fraud." 
Barrett's conduct 'vould be sufficient in showing 
the map, and unqualifiedly asserting the representations 
from Hale to raise a claim for relief. Such conduct is 
best termed culpable neglect. 
As to the defendant :\Iilton -v-. Backman, who acted 
as insurance agent as well as agent for defendants, a 
much higher duty of care not to mislead exists. Restate-
ment of Torts, Sec. 552; Harper and James, supra., Sec. 
7.6. Therefore, it appears clear that a proper cause of 
action was alleged. 
POINT IV. 
PLAINTIFFS ELLIS HAVE ADEQUATELY SiTATED A 
CLAIM FOR RELIEF AGAINST ALL DEFENDAN'TS FOR 
SPECIAL DAMAGES BASED UPON NEGLECT. 
It is submitted that plaintiffs Ellis claim set out in 
the complaint as Clain1 III is 'veil pleaded. This is a 
claim for special da1nages for architect's fees expended 
by Ellis UI)On purchasing "Lot 4." The plaintiff Ellis 
has claimed liability- for negligence on the part of the de-
fendants. In such cases the primary aiin of measuring 
damages for tort is to place the person in a position as 
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nearly as possible as he would have been had no tort 
been couunitted. ~1cl1 orrnick, Damages, Sec. 137. In the 
instant ease the darnages from selling the property in 
violation of a statute could be readily foreseen to have 
included expenses for arc-hitect's fees, since the lot 'vas 
purportedly a building lot. See 17 .LL\_LR 1357.6 Further, 
as to the claims of negligent misrepresentation, special 
da111ap;Ps have been recognized as recoverable thereunder 
if it is the natural and foreseeable result of the 'vrong-
doing. Restatement of Torts, Sec. 549 (b). 
If the plaintiffs' action is 'veil stated, it is certainly 
proper for recovery to be had for all damages flowing 
from the tortious 'vrongdoing of the defendants. \Vhere 
a subdivision building lot is the object sold, it is readily 
foreseeable that a party purchaser may 'vell expend 
1none~~ in preparation to build. The expenditure of archi-
tect~' fees in such instances is readily foreseeable and 
'voul<l be a proper recovery. So long as the damage is 
the foreseeable, proximate result of the wrongdoing, as 
it is here, it is recoverable. ][ cK inney v. Carson, 35 Utah 
180, 99 Pac. 660 (1909). Therefore, the claim for special 
da1nages is "yell pleaded. 
POINT V. 
PLAINTIFFS BURTON HAVE ADEQUATELY STATED 
A eAUSE OF ACTION AS ASSERTED IN THEIR FOURTH 
AND FIFTH CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANTS BACK-
MAN. 
A. FOR NEGLIGENCE. 
6. Although the cases col'lected there relate to contracts, 
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B. UPON A CONTRACT OF INSURANCE. 
The fourth claim of the complaint is by plaintiffs 
Burton, \vho entered into a purchase contract \vith the 
plaintiffs Duncan to purchase Lots 1 and 2 of the prop-
erty sold by defendants to Duncan. The pleadings re-
assert paragraphs "First" through "T,Yenty-Fifth" and 
'·~~hirty Fourth" through "Thirty Seventh" of plain-
tiffs' second amended complaint. It is further alleged 
that Burtons ordered a title insurance policy from Milton 
V. Backman and LeGrand Backman, d/b/a Backman 
Abstract and Title Co., and received policies and interim 
binders, embracing and guaranteeing good title to Lots 
1 and 2. The defendants had knowledge through Thiilton 
\i. Backman that the lots in question \vere not a part of 
a platted subdvision, and that the County Commission 
had denied approval of the lots as building lots. It is 
alleged that in preparing the title insurance binders, 
the defendant Backman failed to disclose the fact that 
the lots \\7ere not subdivision building lots. 
As has been noted before, the la-\v recognizes that, 
''One \vho in the course of his business or profession sup-
plies inforn1ation for the guidance of others in their busi-
ness transaction" is liable for harm incurred to the other, 
who relies thereon, if he fails to exercise due care. Re-
statement of Torts, Sec. 552; Prosser, Torts, 2nd Ed., 541. 
In this regard, liabilit~~ has been placed upon notaries 
public for negligent certification, Biakanja v. Irving, 
49 c·al. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958) ~for negligent \veighing, 
Glnnzrn v. Shepard, 223 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922) ; 
for negligent issuance of a certificate by a city clerk, 
M1tlroy v. IT' right., 185 1\finn. 84, 240 N.W. 116 (1931) ~for 
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negligent F.,liA appraisal, United State,s v. ~T eustadt, 281 
F.2d 596 (1960), reversed on other grounds, 366 U.S. 696 
( 19Gl). A substantial nmnber of cases have held ab-
stractors liable for lack of due care in preparing a title 
abstract, Trisdale v. Shasta (}ounty Title Co., 1-±6 C.A. 
~d 831, 304 P. 2d 832; 7 Prosser, supra, p. 5-±4; l Iarper 
and James, supra, Vol. I, p. 548, N. 13; 1 Am. J ur. Ab-
~tract~ of Title, Sec. 15, 16. Thus the question is, does 
a person who sells title insurance have a duty of reason-
able care to disclose defects of which he is knowledgeable 
concerning the property. As noted by Prosser, op. eit., 
p. 333, a fiduciary duty in an insurance contract arises 
requiring full disclosure. A title insurer should be under 
the sa1ne obligation to disclose defects and use reason-
able care for disclosing errors of title. l\Iany people rely 
upon title insurance in Inaking purchases, as indicating 
the absence of defects, and attorneys are often asked to 
prepare title opinions based upon the disclosures made 
in title insurance policies. Title insurance companies 
endeavor to create and stimulate this thinking in the 
public mind as a 1neans of increasing their business. It 
\vould be closing one's eyes to the facts to say that be-
(·au~(· title insurance is a form of insurance, due care in 
making disclosures respecting title may be avoided. Espe-
cially is this ~o \vhere it is \vell kno\\11 that vendors and 
purchasers often rely on such policies for clear title be-
fore consummating a transaction. This court has recog-
nized that the procuring of title insurance may evidence 
good faith, even where a boundary dispute is involved, 
thus recognizing the title insurance influence on the 
7. Court held action for negligence in preparation of ab-
stract not demurable for contributory negligence. 
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common purchaser of real estate. Alleman v. Miner, 10 
U.2d 356, 353 P.2d 463 ( 1960). In such instances as this, 
title insurance companies should be liable for the negli-
gent failure to disclose defects of which they have knowl-
edge, and where plaintiff is likely to rely upon the ab-
sence of any defects being disclosed in n1aking the pur-
chase. It is submitted, therefore, that Burtons have 
validly pleaded a claim in negligence against defendants' 
Backman. 
The second cause of action by plaintiffs Burton 
against Backman is based upon the breach of "\Yarranty 
and guarantee provisions of the insurance policies. The 
policies "\Yere not presented to the court during the mo-
tion, nor are they a part of the record. In 40 ALR 2d 
1238, relating to this subje(lt, it is said: 
"The questions whether a title insurance 
policy protects against loss sustained by reason 
of the fact that the premises, described by lot 
and subdivision, or map showing abetting streets, 
do not lie 'vithin any tract effectually subdivided 
* * * are of course not to be dealt with other 
than by attending closely to the language of the 
particular polic~~ and its clauses of exception." 
In H oclt·ing v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 37 Cal. 2d 6-!·t 
234 P.2d 625 (1951), the California Supreme Court rec-
ognized the necessity of looking directly at the policy 
provisions "~here a similar issue of failure of subdiYision 
was involved. It is sub1nitted that the plaintiffs Burton 
should be allo"~ed to have the case returned to the Dis-
trict Court to have an opportunity to de1nonstrate that 
the terms of the policy· issued cover the instant clain1. 
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POINT VI. 
PLAINTIFFS DUNCAN AND BARRETT IN CLAIMS 
SIXTH, SEVENTH AND EIGH1TH VALIDLY STATE CLAIMS 
FOR RELIEF UPON BREACH OF A WARRANTY DEED. 
Plaintiff Duncans' causes of action appear in the 
second ainended complaint as the Sixth, Seventh and 
l~ighth claiins, and are against defendants Elders, 1-Iale, 
Fisher and Barrett, based upon breach of warranty by 
virtue of the warranty deeds conveying Lots 1, 2, and 3 
of the plat kno\vn as Mount Olyn1pus Park No. 5. It is 
further alleged that it was understood by all parties that 
residential building lots in approved subdivisions were 
being conveyeu by the deeds, and that this \vas not \vhat 
\vas in fact conveyed. The deeds given were short form 
\varranty deeds similar to those set out under 57-1-12, 
(T. C .A. 1953. 
The provisions of 57-1-12, U.C.A. 1953, provide that 
\vhen a \varrant~v deed is given as required by law, it shall 
have the effect : 
"* * * of a conveyance in fee simple to the 
grantee, his hiers and assigns of the p,remises 
therein named, together with all the appurten-
ances, rights and privileges thereunto belong-
ing, that he is lawfully seized of the pre·mises; 
that he has good right to convey the same * * *." 
It is submitted that \Yhere, as here, it is alleged that 
the parties contemplated the conveyance of subdivision 
building lots, and the same \\'"ere in fact not conveyed by 
reason of the failure of defendants to comply with the re-
quired statutes and ordinances, that defendants have 
breached their warranty of "good right to convey'' and 
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"seizen." They had no right to convey approved build-
ing lots since they owned none, and they had no right 
to convey the land in lots by plat and map since Sections 
17-27-21 and 57-5-5, lT.C.A. 1953 expressly prohibited it. 
Thus, \Vhere the statutes themselves prohibit the convey-
ance, it appears clear that there was no "good right to 
convey'' in the defendants. It has been generally said that 
the covenants of seizen and good right to convey are 
exact equivalents. Rogers v. Amrey, 123 Okla. 70, 251 
Pac. 1013 (1927); American Law of Property, Sec. 12.127. 
It has also been stated: 
"In a majority of the states and in England 
the covenant means that the grantor is seized 
of an indefeasible estate in quality and quantity 
which he purports to convey." 
An1erican La",. of Property, Section 12.127; Burton r. 
Price, 105 Fla. 544, 141 So. 728 (1932). 
Here the defendants had no title to subdivision lots 
a;-; they purported to convey, but only bare title to the 
land; thus they did not own the quality or extent of the 
thing they purported to convey, and hence, breached the 
convenants. Russell v. Belcher, 221 Ala. 360, 128 So. 452 
( 1930). So also they had no legal right under law to even 
1nake the conveyance they did until co1npliance with the 
la")" had been had. There is no question that the lots sold 
related to the subdivision property since this "Tas estab-
lished at the hearing before Judge Sno'v (R. 25), and is 
so alleged in the complaint. (R. 56-67). I .. nder these cir-
cuinstances, it is submitted that a valid claim of lack of 
good right to convey and seizen has been pleaded, as 
breach of warranty under the deeds. 
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If it is argued that the deeds do not purport to con-
vey subdivision lots, it still does not alter the fact that the 
eonvPyanees \\'ere prohibited by statute and, hence, con-
trar~· to the \Yarranty no rnatter \\'hat \vas purported to 
be conveyed. Even so, the conve~Tances here are of Lots 
1, ~' and 3, \vhich certainly indicate a subdivided area . 
.:\t the least, they would be arnbiguous, and parol evi-
dence could be introduced. Thus in Egclnnd v. Fayter, 
51 Utah 579, 172 Pac. 313 (1918), it \Vas said: 
~·As to this question the deed was silent. 
There \Vas a latent a1nbiguity \\rhich either part~r 
had the right to explain by parol testimony if 
such \vas available." 
In the instant case it \vould appear that at the least, 
the plaintiffs should have been allo\ved to introduce 
parol evidence. 16 Am. J ur., Deeds, Sec. 411. 
It is submitted, therefore, that the trial court seri-
ously erred in dismissing plaintiffs Duncans' complaint 
on breach of \varranty, first, because there \vas no right 
to conve~r as a rnatter of la\v; second, the conveyance was 
not of the quantity and quality purported to be conveyed; 
third, at any rate parol evidence ''ras adrnissible to show 
the intention of the parties. 
POINT VII. 
MISJOINDER OF PARTIES AND ISSUES IS NOT A 
VALID GROUND TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT. 
The defendants also moved the trial court to dismiss 
the clailns against l\Iilton ,.... Backman and LeGrand 
Baclanan for 1nisjoinder of parties and misjoinder of 
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claims. It should be remembered that it is alleged that 
Milton \7'". Backman had acted as co-partner of all the de-
fendants in previous transactions, was the attorney and 
agent in fact for defendants Hale; that it is alleged he, 
as one of the defendants, caused the plat Inap of the sub-
division to be displayed to plaintiffs; that he failed to dis-
close material facts concerning the status of the subject 
property, and finally, that, in part, to induce the purchase 
of the lots, he issued title insurance policies to the plain-
tiffs. All claims against Backman arise from the same 
general transaction and occurrence, namely the sale of 
the four purported subdivision lots. Backman partici-
pated as an integral element in the whole transaction. 
At the outset it is "rell to note that if the trial court 
based any part of its ruling on misjoinder of parties, it 
did so erroneously, since Rule 21, U.R.C.P. provides: 
"Misjoinder of parties is not ground for dis-
missal of an action. Parties may be dropped or 
added by order of the court on motion of any 
party or of its o'vn initiative at any stage of 
the action and on such terms as are just. Any 
claim against a party may be severed and pro-
ceeded with .separately.'' 
Thus, any 1notion on misjoinder of parties could not 
lead to dis1nissal, but only severance. 
As to the allegation of 1nisjoinder of claims, Rule 18, 
U.R.C.P. provides: 
"The plaintiff in his complaint or in a reply 
setting forth a counterclaim and the defendant 
in ans"'"er setting forth a counterclaim 1nay join 
either as independent or as alternate claims as 
many claims either legal or equitable or both as 
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he may have against an opposing party. There 
may be like joinder of claims \vhen there are 
multiple parties if the requirements of Rules 19, 
20 and 22 are satisfied. * * *" 
Thus, the joining of claims against 1nultiple defendants 
is per1nitted under the above rule and, as relevant to this 
case, Rule 20, U.R.C.P. Rule 20, U.R.C.P. provides: 
''All persons n1ay join in one action as plain-
tiffs if they assert any right to relief jointly, 
severally, or in the alternative in respect of or 
arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, 
or series of transactions or occurrences and if 
any question of law or fact common to all of them 
'vill arise in the action. All p·ersons may be joined 
in one action as defendants if there is asserted 
against them jointly, severally, or in the alterna-
tive, any rig·ht to relief in respect of or arising 
out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series 
of transactions or occurrences and if any question 
of la'v or fact common to all of them 'vill arise 
in the action. A plaintiff or defendant need not 
be interested in obtaining or defending against all 
the relief demanded. Judgment may be given for 
one or more of the plaintiffs according to their re-
spective rights to relief, and against one or more 
defendants according to their respective liabili-
ties." 
It appears clear that in the instant case the defend-
ants are all being sued out of the same general trans-
action and occurrence and a common question of law 
and facts is alleged against all defendants. Thus, they 
were properly joined. Even if it \Vere found that a mis-
joinder of claims was made, dismissal is not appropriate 
relief. Man-Sew Pinking Att. Corp. v. Chandler Machine 
Co., 29 F. Supp. 480 (1939). The federal rules serve·d as 
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the pattern for our rules, and the joinder and severance 
provisions are the same. Professor Moore, in commenting 
on the effect of misjoinder of federal claims, notes: 
"The Federal Rules are so flexible on joinder 
of actions and parties that misjoinder of actions 
will rarely occur. But if there is a misjoinder, 
as where A and B, each with a separate cause of 
action, join as plaintiffs and there is no question 
of law or fact common to their claims, the court 
is not obl~ged to dismiss the suit. Rule 21 pro-
vides that 'any clai1n against a party may be 
severed and proceeded \vith separately.' Hence 
if there is federal jurisdiction to support each 
cause of action, the court should normally order a 
severance. * * *" 
Moore's Federal Practice, \T ol. 3, Sec. 18.05. 
Thus, it appears clear that the defendants' motion 
for dismissal on a misjoinder ground \vas not well taken, 
5 Fed. Rules Serv. 828, and to the degree the trial court 
may have so ruled, error was committed. 
CONCLUSION 
The instant court 1nay only affirm the trial court's 
dismissal \Yith prejudice if under any conceivable state 
of facts pleaded, none of the plaintiffs have stated a 
cause of action under an~T theory against any of the de-
fendants. In this case it appears clear that the actions 
pleaded \vere p·roper, and defendants should be compelled 
to answer on penalty of default. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ADAM M. DUNCAN 
RONALD N. BOYCE 
Attorneys for Appellants. 
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